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99 N.C. L. REV. 1167 (2021)

Flag of Convenience: Substituting Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine for
Equal Protection Analysis in Manning v. Caldwell *
In the 2019 case Manning v. Caldwell, the Fourth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of a Virginia statutory scheme that allowed “habitual drunkards”
to be civilly interdicted. Plaintiffs argued that this scheme had been used to
repeatedly jail and prosecute homeless alcoholics. Setting aside arguments under due
process and equal protection, the Fourth Circuit instead raised the void-forvagueness doctrine to hold the scheme unconstitutional.
This Recent Development provides the equal protection analysis that the Fourth
Circuit strategically circumvented by using the void-for-vagueness doctrine. That
analysis requires discriminatory intent in the initial passage of a facially neutral law
to trigger heightened scrutiny. A review of the history of the challenged statutory
scheme shows that the plaintiffs likely would have failed to meet this burden.
In circumventing equal protection analysis, the Fourth Circuit illustrates a failing
in current equal protection doctrine—that the requirement of showing
discriminatory intent in the initial passage of a law is too high a bar and can lead
to paradoxical results, especially when application of a facially neutral law has
changed over time. In response, this Recent Development proposes a lower
evidentiary bar when plaintiffs have credibly alleged disparate impact, but the
challenged statute lacks sufficient legislative history. Although not guaranteeing
plaintiffs a win, or even heightened scrutiny, the proposal would at least give
plaintiffs a fighting chance.
INTRODUCTION
During the War of 1812, American ships in the Atlantic often sailed under
Portuguese flags. 1 Flying a flag of convenience, as the practice became known,
was a strategic decision to avoid detection and detention of sailors by a British
Royal Navy unafraid of American naval power. 2 By simply replacing the
American flag with Portuguese colors, American ships could bypass blockades,
sail past their British foes undetected, and avoid impressment of their crew.
In Manning v. Caldwell, 3 the Fourth Circuit chose to fly its own flag of
convenience by raising the void-for-vagueness doctrine to avoid applying the
* © 2021 Nathan Pinnell.
1. See Tina Shaughnessy & Ellen Tobin, Flags of Inconvenience: Freedom and Insecurity on the High
Seas, J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 2006–2007, at 1, 16.
2. See id.
3. 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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Equal Protection Clause. The court considered a challenge to a Virginia scheme
allowing civil interdiction of “habitual drunkards,” who were then subject to
enhanced criminal penalties for alcohol-related offenses. 4 Setting aside
arguments under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Fourth
Circuit instead raised the void-for-vagueness doctrine sua sponte. 5 The voidfor-vagueness doctrine originated as a common-law rule implied under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and requires that criminal
offenses be defined clearly so ordinary people would understand what conduct
is prohibited and, specifically, so arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
those offenses is not encouraged. 6 Sailing under the colors of the void-forvagueness doctrine, the Fourth Circuit found the term habitual drunkard to be
“unconstitutionally vague” 7 and to “invite arbitrary enforcement.” 8
This Recent Development analyzes that application of the void-forvagueness doctrine, positing that the Fourth Circuit used it to circumvent
ruling against the sympathetic plaintiffs’ losing equal protection argument.
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, an exploration of the plaintiffs’
losing argument in Manning reveals the counterintuitive results under current
equal protection doctrine, which often departs from the aims of providing equal
protection of the law. In response, this Recent Development suggests a
modification of how courts treat claims of disparate impact under facially
neutral laws with a dearth of legislative history which, while fitting with existing
precedent, would provide plaintiffs with a chance of success.
This Recent Development’s analysis is divided into four parts. Part I
discusses the relevant facts of Manning. Part II provides the legislative history
of the statute considered by the Fourth Circuit in Manning. Part III analyzes
Manning under the Equal Protection Clause in light of this history. Part IV
proposes a reinterpretation of equal protection analysis that would obviate the
need to substitute void-for-vagueness doctrine for equal protection.

4. Id. at 268.
5. Id. at 271–72.
6. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
7. Manning, 930 F.3d at 274.
8. See id. at 276 (finding that the Commonwealth’s argument that a habitual drunkard is someone
who “causes harm to other persons or their community” leaves the definition to the “subjective view
of judges and law enforcement officials”).
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I. RAISING THE FLAG: THE RELEVANT FACTS OF MANNING
In March 2016, four homeless people 9 suffering from alcoholism brought
suit against the City of Roanoke, Virginia. 10 These individuals alleged that the
city used a Virginia statutory scheme to repeatedly prosecute them based on
their status as vulnerable alcoholics. 11 Under section 4.1-333(A) of the Code of
Virginia (“section 4.1-333(A)”), courts were permitted to enter a civil
interdiction order to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to individuals who
had “shown [themselves] to be a habitual drunkard.” 12 The term habitual
drunkard was not defined in Virginia’s statutory scheme nor was a clear
standard provided for how a person would have “shown” themselves to be one.
However, once a person was designated as a habitual drunkard, they were
prohibited from consuming; purchasing; possessing; or attempting to consume,
purchase, or possess any alcoholic beverage 13 and were subject to punishment of
up to a year in prison and as much as a $2,500 fine upon violation. 14
In Manning, the plaintiffs put forth evidence purporting to show that
enforcement of section 4.1-333(A) disparately impacted people similar to
themselves. 15 The plaintiffs’ key evidence showed that of the 4,743 prosecutions
for the possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by interdicted persons
between 2005 and 2015, only 1,220 distinct individuals were interdicted
between 2007 and 2015. 16 Of those interdicted persons, many were homeless
and struggled with chronic alcoholism, addiction, or other physical and mental
illnesses. 17
The plaintiffs initially alleged four grounds for invalidation of the
statutory scheme—including the void-for-vagueness doctrine 18—but the district
9. Use of the term “the homeless” as a collective noun can be considered dehumanizing. Alissa
Walker & Emma Alpern, The Language Around Homelessness Is Finally Changing, CURBED (June 11,
2020, 1:32 PM), https://archive.curbed.com/2020/6/11/21273455/homeless-people-definition-copyediting [https://perma.cc/HUX8-URLX]. As such, I instead use “homeless people” throughout this
Recent Development.
10. See Manning, 930 F.3d at 268–69.
11. Id. at 269–70.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A) (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb. and
Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I). Section 4.1-333(A) also allows civil interdiction of drunk drivers, but the
plaintiffs in Manning did not contest the constitutionality of that aspect. Id.; see also Manning, 930 F.3d
at 269 n.1.
13. Id. § 4.1-305(A) (making consumption, possession, or purchase of alcohol by prohibited
persons a Class 1 misdemeanor); see also id. § 4.1-304(A) (designating “interdicted” persons as those
prohibited from purchasing alcoholic beverages).
14. Id. § 18.2-11(a) (setting the punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors).
15. Manning, 930 F.3d at 269.
16. Id.
17. Maria Slater, Note, Is Powell Still Valid? The Supreme Court’s Changing Stance on Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 104 VA. L. REV. 547, 585 (2018).
18. Manning, 930 F.3d at 270 (“Plaintiffs . . . alleg[ed] that the Virginia scheme (1) constituted
cruel and unusual punishment outlawed by the Eighth Amendment, (2) deprived them of due process
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court rejected all four claims. 19 Upon appeal before a three-judge panel, the
plaintiffs declined to argue the void-for-vagueness claim 20 and the panel
affirmed the decision of the district court below. 21
The Fourth Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc, 22 this time
holding that the term habitual drunkard violated the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. 23 First, despite the void-for-vagueness doctrine traditionally applying
only in a criminal context, 24 the court stated that the “integrated structure of
the challenged scheme” which “plainly ha[d] criminal consequences” made
section 4.1-333(A) “quasi-criminal” in nature. 25 Under precedent, 26 therefore,
the civil consequences imposed by section 4.1-333(A) warranted a “relatively
strict” test for vagueness. 27
With the applicability of the void-for-vagueness rule established, the court
turned to the second step: applying this “relatively strict” test for vagueness. 28
In applying the test, the Fourth Circuit pointed to the “absence of meaningful
guidance” as to proscribed conduct under section 4.1-333(A) or who would
qualify as a habitual drunkard, 29 especially as compared to well-defined terms
in the Code of Virginia, such as “intoxicated.” 30 The “arbitrary enforcement”
invited by the lack of standards for the term habitual drunkard was particularly
important for the court. 31 In the court’s view, the lack of clear guidelines

of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) denied them the equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and (4) was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 271.
21. Id. at 270. For a discussion of Manning’s treatment of addiction and voluntariness for the
purposes of enforcing criminal law, see generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, Criminal Law x Addiction, 99
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021).
22. Manning, 930 F.3d at 270.
23. See id. at 272–74. The Fourth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs stated a claim that the
statutory scheme constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 265.
24. See id. at 303 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has spoken of vagueness in
explicitly criminal terms for decades.”). But see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212–13 (2018)
(holding that the void-for-vagueness doctrine may apply in noncriminal deportation proceedings).
25. Manning, 930 F.3d at 273 (majority opinion).
26. See Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)
(holding that laws imposing civil penalties with “prohibitory and stigmatizing effect[] may warrant a
relatively strict test”).
27. Manning, 930 F.3d at 273.
28. See id. at 273–78.
29. Id. at 274–75.
30. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-100 (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb. and
Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I) (“‘Intoxicated’ means a condition in which a person has drunk enough alcoholic
beverages to observably affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general
appearance, or behavior.”).
31. Manning, 930 F.3d at 276.
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confirmed that “the law was designed to target persons, including the homeless,
that state officials deem undesirable.” 32
II. UNFURLING THE COLORS: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
SECTION 4.1-333(A)
Despite concluding that section 4.1-333(A) was “designed” to target
people found undesirable by state officials, the Fourth Circuit delved only
briefly into its history. 33 In its discussion of the legislative history of section 4.1333(A), the court identified the scheme as “dat[ing] to the late nineteenth
century” at which point it had a “rehabilitative purpose,” allowing family
members or friends to petition for someone under the influence of alcohol to be
subjected to a hearing and possibly home confinement to restore them to
sobriety. 34 According to the court, Virginia abandoned this rehabilitative
approach in 1934 and adopted the punitive scheme at issue in Manning in its
place. 35
However, a closer look at the history of section 4.1-333(A) reveals a more
nuanced story—a tale of two statutes. The first statute, section 46-1070 of the
Virginia Code of 1936 (the “rehabilitative statute”), 36 followed the path initially
described by the Fourth Circuit. 37 The rehabilitative statute offered a means for
a court to intervene when a family member or friend was concerned about an
individual who was a habitual drunkard or otherwise addicted. 38 The second
statute, section 184A-4675 of the Virginia Code of 1936 (“the improper-person
statute”), 39 the true precursor to section 4.1-333(A), put forth the punitive
scheme of civil interdiction at issue in Manning. It originated in the wake of the
passage of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933 and was aimed at regulating
the sale and possession of alcohol in the state of Virginia. 40 But the two statutes
are distinct: before the revision of the Code of Virginia in 1950, both statutes
existed simultaneously. 41

32. Id.
33. See id. at 270 n.3 (outlining the history of section 4.1-333(A)).
34. Id.
35. Id. Notably, this information is provided without giving a citation. See id. Presumably, the
court was referring to the Virginia Legislature’s passage of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1934,
ch. 94, 1934 Va. Acts 100 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-100 (LEXIS through the 2021
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I)).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1070 (1936).
37. Manning, 930 F.3d at 270 n.3.
38. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1070 (1936).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 184A-4675 (1936).
40. See Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1934, 1934 Va. Acts at 100.
41. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-1070, 184A-4675 (1936).
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The rehabilitative statute served a purely rehabilitative purpose. 42 When
relatives or friends (if there were no living relatives) were concerned about a
person thought to be a “habitual drunkard, opium eater, or addicted to other
drug habits,” the rehabilitative statute allowed for a complaint in writing to be
filed with a justice of the peace. 43 If after a hearing and examination by a
physician the person were found to be addicted, that individual could be
committed to a private hospital or sanitarium, provided that such treatment
might prove beneficial to them. 44 The rehabilitative statute was strictly timelimited, as “no such inebriate . . . [could] be compelled . . . to remain in said
hospital or sanitarium for a period exceeding four months, without his or her
consent.” 45
The confusion between section 4.1-333(A) and the rehabilitative statute
likely stems from the use of habitual drunkard in both (although the original
codification of section 4.1-333 did not include the term). 46 Originally a part of
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1934, 47 the improper-person subsection
allowed a court to enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of alcoholic
beverages to anyone who “[was] convicted of driving or running any automobile
. . . while intoxicated or has shown himself to be an improper person to be
allowed to purchase alcoholic beverages.” 48 Unlike the time-limited, compelled
treatment allowed by the rehabilitative statute, the order of interdiction was
indefinite, prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages “until further ordered.” 49
Coincidentally, the void-for-vagueness doctrine was the reason the term
habitual drunkard was first adopted in the precursors to section 4.1-333(A).
Following its recodification in 1950, the Code of Virginia initially retained the
term “improper person” in section 4-51, the recodified version of the improperperson subsection. 50 This changed in 1955, when the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia 51 held in Booth v. Commonwealth 52 that the term improper person
was “unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.” 53 The following year, the
42. See Manning, 930 F.3d at 270 n.3; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1070 (1936) (outlining how
habitual drunkards could be committed to private hospitals).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1070 (1936).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 46-1071.
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A) (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.
and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I); VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1070 (1936).
47. Ch. 94, 1934 Va. Acts 100 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-100 (LEXIS through
the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I)).
48. Id. § 35, 1934 Va. Acts at 123.
49. Id.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 4-51 (1950).
51. In 1971, the name of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was changed to its current
name, the Supreme Court of Virginia. A Short History of the Supreme Court of Virginia, VA. APP. CT.
HIST., https://scvahistory.org/scv/supreme-court-of-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/6CCD-AGF7].
52. 88 S.E.2d 916 (Va. 1955).
53. Id. at 918.
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Virginia General Assembly responded by replacing the term improper person
with habitual drunkard, 54 the language that was later used in section 4.1-333(A),
and which would eventually be struck down by Manning.
The Virginia General Assembly did not make its intentions clear in
preventing an improper person from purchasing alcohol in either section 4-51
or the improper person subsection, but the context and initial enforcement give
the appearance that the language was intended to prevent bootlegging. As a
whole, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1934 was principally concerned
with establishing a regulatory system to oversee the sale and distribution of
alcohol following the end of the Prohibition Era. 55 The subsections immediately
following the improper-person subsection detailed how to determine which
items relating to alcoholic beverages were contraband (for example, stills), 56
provided procedures for obtaining search warrants, 57 and outlined the
appropriate process for confiscating such contraband. 58 Early enforcement of
the language gives a similar impression. In Booth, John Booth was originally
designated as an improper person because there was evidence tending to show
he had illegally sold alcoholic beverages, albeit insufficient evidence to convict
him of a crime. 59
The Virginia General Assembly’s intent in replacing improper person with
habitual drunkard is also unclear but was likely an attempt to clarify the law.
With the change coming only five months after the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia struck down the term improper person as unconstitutional, 60 the
legislature’s action was likely motivated by the Booth decision that found the
term unconstitutionally vague. And, in using the term habitual drunkard, the
legislature was not creating a new term; rather, it was appropriating a term with
a long history in Virginia law. In the rehabilitative statute and its precursors,
the term habitual drunkard had been used for civil commitment of individuals

54. Act of Feb. 16, 1956, ch. 53, 1956 Va. Acts 45 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1333 (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I)).
55. See Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of 1934, ch. 94, §§ 3–31, 1934 Va. Acts 100, 103–21
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-100 (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen.
Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I)) (establishing the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, and various licensing procedures for the sale of
alcohol).
56. Id. § 36, 1934 Va. Acts at 123.
57. Id. § 37, 1934 Va. Acts at 123–24.
58. Id. § 38, 1934 Va. Acts at 124–25. The next subsections criminalize a variety of behaviors
related to alcoholic beverages. See id. §§ 39–52, 1934 Va. Acts 125–28.
59. Booth v. Commonwealth, 88 S.E.2d 916, 917 (Va. 1955).
60. Booth was decided on September 14, 1955. Id. at 916. The session law changing improper
person to habitual drunkard was approved on February 16, 1956. Act of Feb. 16, 1956, ch. 53, 1956 Va.
Acts 45 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333 (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the
Gen. Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I)).
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since at least 1872. 61 Moreover, individuals determined to be habitual drunkards
could be prevented from obtaining a driver’s license or chauffeur’s license; 62
have their license to practice optometry revoked; 63 or even have their
certification to work as an architect, professional engineer, or land surveyor
revoked. 64 In replacing improper person with habitual drunkard, then, the
Virginia legislature may have felt it was replacing an “unconstitutionally vague”
term with one more readily defined by its historical usage. 65
III. TRUE COLORS: MANNING ANALYZED UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS
Thus, the history of section 4.1-333(A) and its precursors provide little
evidence for the conclusion that the law “was designed to target persons,
including the homeless, that state officials deem undesirable.” 66 And while the
history of section 4.1-333(A) was not a large component of the majority’s
analysis in Manning under the void-for-vagueness claim, the history proves
important in evaluating another claim brought by the plaintiffs but left
unaddressed by the court: that the statutory scheme deprived them of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 But on closer examination, the
court’s sidestep of the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument seems to be a sly
judicial maneuver meant to provide a fair outcome in the face of a doctrine that
would have otherwise withheld one. 68 Indeed, had the court taken up the equal
protection argument, the argument was unlikely to have succeeded. 69
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any
state from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” 70 As a practical matter, this requires that “all persons similarly
61. An Act to Incorporate the Inebriate’s Home, ch. 172, 1872 Va. Acts 231 (1872) (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 83-5 (1874)).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 90C-2154(174)(c) (1936).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 68-1635 (1936).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 125A-3145j(d) (1936).
65. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit’s previous position was that the Virginia Legislature was correct.
See Fisher v. Coleman, 486 F. Supp. 311, 315 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), abrogated by Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
66. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 276 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
67. Id. at 270.
68. However, this is not the first time a court has used the void-for-vagueness doctrine in lieu of
another doctrine to achieve a desired result. See Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court
Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental
Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2010) (“[T]he draft opinions in the Justices’ papers did not in fact
rely on vagueness alone. In addition, they relied at first on the Ninth Amendment and then on
substantive due process.”).
69. See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In order to establish
[an equal protection] violation, however, it is not enough to show the ordinance has a disproportionate
impact upon the homeless.”).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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situated should be treated alike.” 71 But laws are still allowed to classify among
individuals; generally, a classification drawn by a given statute will be upheld if
the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 72 Rational
basis review, as it is known, is highly deferential to the government, presuming
legislation is valid unless demonstrated otherwise. 73
However, in the context of equal protection, a litigant typically triggers
heightened scrutiny if they show that a law makes classifications on the basis of
a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Suspect classifications arise when legislation
demonstrates “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . tend[ing]
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities.” 74 Suspect classifications will typically
warrant strict scrutiny and include characteristics such as race, national origin,
religion, alienage, and nonresidency. 75 Quasi-suspect classes, including sex and
the legitimacy of a child, are typically entitled to an intermediate level of
scrutiny. 76 The burden placed on the government under even an intermediate
level of heightened scrutiny requires a showing that the challenged classification
serves “important governmental objectives” to which the classification is
“substantially related.” 77 If strict scrutiny is triggered, the government must
show that classifications are “narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests.” 78
The analysis in this part proceeds in two sections. First, Section III.A
analyzes the potential classifications made by section 4.1-333(A) and ultimately
concludes that no such classification warrants heightened scrutiny. Second,
Section III.B applies an equal protection analysis to section 4.1-333(A) and
concludes that the plaintiffs’ arguments would have failed under both rational
basis review and any form of heightened scrutiny.
A.

Possible Suspect Classifications in Manning

In alleging an equal protection violation, the plaintiffs in Manning argued
that although section 4.1-333(A) was “not limited to the homeless, in practice
it function[ed] as a tool to rid the streets of particularly vulnerable, unwanted
alcoholics like themselves.” 79 This argument presents several potential suspect
71. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
72. Id. at 440.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
75. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 858, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021).
76. Id. § 859.
77. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). The burden placed on the government
under strict scrutiny is even more demanding and requires classifications to be “narrowly tailored to
further compelling governmental interests.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
78. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
79. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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classes: (1) homeless people, (2) alcoholics, and even (3) homeless alcoholics. In
the analysis that follows, I will in turn examine each of these classes for possible
suspect or quasi-suspect status.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether homeless
people constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 80 courts that have considered
the issue have concluded they do not. 81 In so holding, these courts have
invariably rejected the argument that because “the homeless have no access to
private property, they are an insular minority which has no place to retreat from
the public domain.” 82 Rather, most courts consider homeless people a “subset
of the poor,” 83 falling under Supreme Court precedent that distinctions based
on wealth or poverty generally do not constitute suspect classifications or
warrant heightened scrutiny. 84
However, some academic works argue that homelessness should be a quasisuspect or suspect class. They note several factors that “militat[e] strongly for
suspect classification,” such as the historical discrimination and political
powerlessness experienced by homeless people, the relatively immutable nature
of homelessness, and the reality that people often become homeless because of
mental health problems or substance misuse. 85 Moreover, given the physical
and social isolation of homeless people from society, homeless people might
meet “both [a] narrow definition of ‘discrete and insular’ and [the] broader
definition . . . intended by the . . . Court.” 86
Even setting aside arguments that homelessness should or should not be a
protected class, asserting that section 4.1-333(A) impermissibly made
80. Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect
Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 511 (2003).
81. See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that
homeless people do not constitute a suspect class); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“Homeless persons are not a suspect class . . . .”); Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F. Supp.
989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996) (same).
82. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992). In this case, the trial
court indicated that it was not “entirely convinced that homelessness as a class has none of the[]
‘traditional indicia of suspectness.’” Id. (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)). However, the court found that “resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of evidence
presented at trial.” Id.
83. Watson, supra note 80, at 511.
84. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (“But this Court has never held that financial
need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”). But see Jones v. City
of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 136 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a statute prohibiting “sitting, lying,
or sleeping” outdoors violated the Eighth Amendment because, for homeless people, that conduct was
“involuntary and inseparable from status”).
85. Greg Vamos, Note, Kreimer v. Bureau of Police: Are the Homeless Ready for Suspect
Classification?, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 731, 742–45 (1993).
86. Watson, supra note 80, at 517–18; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938) (noting that heightened judicial scrutiny may be needed to protect “discrete and insular
minorities” when prejudice against them prevents the operation of political processes which would
otherwise protect them).
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classifications on the basis of homelessness remained a weak argument for the
plaintiffs. First, as the plaintiffs themselves admitted, the terms of section 4.1333(A) did not limit its application to homeless people. 87 Moreover, unlike
other ordinances with a disparate impact on the homeless, 88 the Virginia
statutory scheme was not limited to outdoor or public conduct. 89 And although
some states historically conflated the term habitual drunkard with vagrancy, 90
Virginia is not one of those states. 91 In this context, there is no apparent
classification based on homelessness in the statutory scheme at issue in
Manning.
The second potential suspect class, alcoholics, similarly offers little
support for heightened scrutiny than does homelessness. Although the Supreme
Court has not yet issued a decisive ruling on whether alcoholics constitute a
suspect class, circuit courts that have considered the topic have uniformly held
alcoholics to be neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect class for the purposes of
equal protection analysis. 92 In Mitchell v. Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, 93 for example, the Fourth Circuit refused to extend heightened
scrutiny to a law which directly prohibited the award of disability benefits to
those disabled by alcoholism or drug addiction. 94
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent provides mixed support, at best, for
the designation of alcoholics as a suspect class. 95 In Robinson v. California, 96 the
Court considered whether a state could criminalize addiction to narcotics. 97 In
reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Court noted that “narcotic addiction
87. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
88. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000) (providing evidence that
the ordinance at issue was targeted toward homeless people because “at least 98 percent of those
arrested under the ordinance were homeless” people). The relevant ordinance in Joel v. City of Orlando,
232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000), prohibited sleeping or cooking outdoors, or otherwise being in a
temporary shelter, on public and private property (unless the owner gave permission) within city limits.
Id. at 1356.
89. Manning, 930 F.3d at 281 n.14.
90. Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling Americans: The Legacy of Prohibition on U.S. Immigration Law, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 781, 793 (2014) (“[L]aws sometimes equated public intoxication with vagrancy by
listing a ‘common drunkard’ or ‘habitual drunkard’ as a per se vagrant.”).
91. See id. at 793 n.61.
92. Mitchell v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 182 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Palmer
v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a student’s suspension for alcohol use “was
not based on a suspect classification”); Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1067 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“The status of being an alcoholic, or a recovering alcoholic, is not a suspect class for equal protection
analysis, and so the lowest level of scrutiny applies to the defendants’ action.”).
93. 182 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1999).
94. See id. at 274. Admittedly, it could be argued that the Fourth Circuit chose to go in a different
direction in Manning by recognizing alcoholism as an illness. Manning, 930 F.3d at 282.
95. See generally Sidhu, supra note 21 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of people with
addiction).
96. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
97. Id. at 660.
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is an illness” and held that a law convicting someone on that basis inflicted a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98
However, only six years after the Robinson decision, the Supreme Court decided
Powell v. Texas, 99 which considered a statute criminalizing drinking or being
intoxicated in a public place. 100 In a 4-1-4 decision, the Court held that a
conviction under the statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 101 In the
opinion of the plurality, the defendant was convicted not because of his status
as a chronic alcoholic but because of his conduct (appearing in public while
drunk). 102
In light of this precedent, the Fourth Circuit in Manning was confronted
with an uphill battle to find that section 4.1-333(A) triggered heightened
scrutiny by classifying on the basis of alcoholism. The Fourth Circuit further
expressed doubts that the terms habitual drunkards and alcoholic were
congruous. 103 While the term habitual drunkard certainly included some
alcoholics within its purview, its unclear definition resulted in many (or indeed
most) alcoholics never being classified as habitual drunkards. The application
of section 4.1-333(A) bore this out as well, as only 1,220 individuals were
interdicted between 2007 and 2015, 104 despite there being an estimated 500,000
alcoholics in the state of Virginia. 105
Because many of those interdicted individuals were both homeless and
struggled with alcoholism, 106 the most precise class targeted by section 4.1333(A) could be described as “homeless alcoholics,” 107 but this categorization
faces similar issues. As neither homeless people nor alcoholics have separately
been recognized as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, recognition of a narrower
subset of those classes proves unlikely. 108 Moreover, with increased specificity
comes increased evidentiary issues. Showing that homeless people or alcoholics
are a “discrete and insular minority” has proven challenging but proving that
98. Id. at 667.
99. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 517.
101. Id. at 515.
102. Id. at 532.
103. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (questioning whether the
term “‘habitual drunkard,’ as used in Virginia law, could be limited to alcoholics”).
104. Id. at 269.
105. Frank Green, Federal Appeals Court To Hear Challenge to Virginia’s Habitual Drunkard Law,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 29, 2019), https://richmond.com/news/plus/federal-appealscourt-to-hear-challenge-to-virginia-s-habitual/article_ec156469-f336-5237-821a-5820431e55b2.html
[https://perma.cc/8F68-GTT6 (dark archive)].
106. Slater, supra note 17, at 585.
107. See Manning, 930 F.3d at 281 n.14 (“As noted above, Plaintiffs allege that the Virginia statute
targets homeless alcoholics, rather than all alcoholics.”).
108. See Watson, supra note 80, at 511 (noting that because homeless people have been considered
a “subset of the poor,” courts have rarely analyzed whether homeless people may constitute their own
suspect class).
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homeless alcoholics are a “discrete and insular minority” would prove even more
challenging, as it would require finding a history of discrimination specifically
targeted at homeless alcoholics.
It thus seems unlikely that the Fourth Circuit would have applied
heightened scrutiny for the equal protection analysis in Manning on the basis of
section 4.1-333(A) impermissibly classifying on homelessness, alcoholism, or
any combination of the two.
B.

Section 4.1-333(A) Examined Under Equal Protection Analysis

Even if the Fourth Circuit found that homeless alcoholics comprised a
protected class, thereby triggering heightened scrutiny, the plaintiffs’ equal
protection argument was still unlikely to succeed. When a facially neutral law
is shown to have a disparate impact on a protected class, the Equal Protection
Clause is only violated if a discriminatory purpose against that class can also be
proven. 109 Discriminatory purpose is separate from the application of the law
and instead asks whether the initial passage of the law was “shaped” by
discriminatory intent. 110 For a law to be shaped by discriminatory intent, the
legislature needs more than mere knowledge that harm might result to a group;
rather, the legislature must act “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” adverse
effects upon that group. 111

109. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274–81 (1979) (holding a veteran-plus hiring policy
disproportionately impacting women did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because no
discriminatory purpose was shown).
110. Id. at 276. Just because a law has a clear disproportionate impact does not mean that it is a
“purposely discriminatory device.” See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 229–31 (1976) (holding
that a verbal skills test for police officers, which four times as many Black people failed compared to
White people, did not violate Equal Protection because no discriminatory purpose was claimed).
111. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Determining whether discriminatory intent was a substantial or
motivating factor in the passage of a law “demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). The Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), provided a nonexhaustive list of five factors to consider when
determining if discriminatory intent has motivated passage of a law, including: (1) the historical
background of the decision, (2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision, (3) departures
from the normal procedural sequence of passage, (4) substantive departures, and (5) legislative or
administrative history. Id. at 267–68. Thus, the Second Circuit applied only rational basis review to an
affirmative action policy for businesses based on a definition of Hispanic that did not include those of
non-Latin American descent because the plaintiffs could point to nothing in the law’s history,
enforcement, or sequence of events leading up to its enactment that would support an inference of antiSpanish “animus.” Jana-Rock Constr. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 212 (2d Cir.
2006). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit found sufficient evidence that an election-reform law
was based on discriminatory intent because of a history of racial discrimination in North Carolina, the
speed at which the law passed through the legislative process following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), and a legislative history indicating consideration of
racial data in passage of the law. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 223–30
(4th Cir. 2016).
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While the plaintiffs in Manning put forth evidence of the disparate impact
of section 4.1-333(A) on homeless alcoholics, 112 they failed to show that a
discriminatory purpose toward homeless alcoholics shaped the passage of the
law. As previously discussed, the inclusion of the term habitual drunkard was a
response to a previous version of section 4.1-333(A) being struck down under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine in a contextually different case brought by an
individual accused of illegally selling alcohol. 113 Even the previous version of
section 4.1-333(A) (using the term improper person instead of habitual
drunkard) offers little evidence that it was shaped by discriminatory intent
towards homeless alcoholics. Indeed, section 4.1-333(A) makes no mention of
other terminology that might be associated with homeless people—for example,
by making the term habitual drunkard equivalent to per se vagrancy 114 or by
prohibiting activity outdoors. 115 And, from its initial passage in 1934,
section 4.1-333(A) and its precursors have allowed the interdiction of
individuals who operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated, 116 an activity
unlikely to have been associated with homelessness at the time.
Because equal protection analysis was destined to fail under heightened
scrutiny, rational basis review would prove no kinder. Under rational basis
review, a statute is “presumed to be valid” and will be upheld as long as the
statute is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 117 This bar is
incredibly low; statutes survive an equal protection challenge under rational
basis review “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.” 118 The burden would be on the
plaintiffs, then, to “negat[e] every conceivable basis which might support it.” 119
However, rational basis review has been elevated beyond this low bar in
some contexts. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 120 the
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited
households containing unrelated individuals from receiving food stamps under
equal protection analysis. 121 Finding the classification could not be sustained
under rational basis review, the Court pointed to a legislative history indicating
that the classification was intended to prevent “hippie communes” from

112. See Manning, 930 F.3d at 269 (“Plaintiffs allege that, although by its terms the challenged
scheme is not limited to the homeless, in practice it functions as a tool to rid the streets of . . . unwanted
alcoholics like themselves.”).
113. See supra Part II.
114. See Rathod, supra note 90, at 793.
115. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000).
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 184A-4675(35) (1936).
117. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
118. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
119. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
120. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
121. Id. at 529.
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participating in the food stamp program. 122 Although the Court did not
comment on whether the statute had a disparate impact in practice, the Court
held that “bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” 123 And, though still not
applying a form of rational basis review, the Court went on to set aside other
possible justifications offered by the government. 124 In effect, the Supreme
Court found that legislation shaped by a discriminatory purpose, even without
evidence of disparate impact or infringement of the rights of a protected class,
gave rise to some form of additional scrutiny in practice. In practice, this
additional scrutiny allowed the Supreme Court to effectively remove the
presumption of rationality for the government’s justification, and instead, the
Court evaluated whether those justifications were in fact rational.
But as was the case under heightened scrutiny, the plaintiffs in Manning
would have seen their equal protection argument struck down under rational
basis review. Put simply, the history of section 4.1-333(A) and its precursors do
not show a discriminatory intent toward homeless alcoholics and instead reveal
the creation of a regulatory system for alcohol distribution. 125 With no
discriminatory intent shaping the passage of the legislation, the test simply
becomes “whether the governmental end is legitimate and whether the means
chosen to further that end are rationally related to it.” 126
This is a test that section 4.1-333(A) could satisfy. Indeed, this is a test
that section 4.1-333(A) did satisfy when originally considered by the Fourth
Circuit before the en banc rehearing. 127 In that decision, a three-judge panel of
the Fourth Circuit held that “Virginia has a legitimate interest in discouraging
alcohol abuse and its attendant risks to public safety and wellbeing.” 128 In
“identifying those at the greatest risk for alcohol abuse” and “restricting their
ability to possess” alcohol, the interdiction scheme was rationally related to that
interest and preventing the attendant risks. 129 Any potential argument made by
the plaintiffs in Manning based on the Equal Protection Clause thus seemed
certain to fail.

122. Id. at 534.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 535–36.
125. See supra Part II.
126. Siena Corp. v. Mayor of Rockville, 873 F.3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 2017).
127. See Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 153 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th
Cir. 2019).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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IV. LOWERING THE FLAG: OBVIATING THE NEED FOR VOID FOR
VAGUENESS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
The certainty of failure of the plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments in
Manning reveals the counterintuitive nature underlying current equal
protection analysis. Although the Equal Protection Clause prohibits denying
any person “equal protection of the laws” 130 and requires that “all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike,” 131 the plaintiffs in Manning would
have had no recourse (even when able to show the law had a disparate impact)
but for the void-for-vagueness doctrine. On the other hand, in Moreno, the
Supreme Court struck down a statute based on an equal protection analysis that
classified on the basis of a nonsuspect class even though that statute was not
shown to have any actual impact on the targeted class. 132 Thus, equal protection
analysis provided relief when a nonsuspect class (hippies) could have been
unequally impacted by application of a law. On the other hand, no relief was
available when a nonsuspect class (homeless alcoholics) was unequally impacted
by application of a law. But when discriminatory purpose is the byword of equal
protection analysis, such counterintuitive outcomes are likely to result.
These counterintuitive results are most common in statutes with long
histories, such as section 4.1-333(A) and its precursors. Had the plaintiffs in
Manning been able to show a discriminatory intent behind the replacement of
improper person with habitual drunkard, they may have been able to succeed in
their equal protection challenge. 133 But, at the time that the plaintiffs brought
their challenge, the term habitual drunkard had been used in section 4.1-333(A)
and its predecessors for over sixty years, 134 making it difficult to trace evidence
of legislative history beyond statutory language. Moreover, despite a lack of
evidence that the use of the term habitual drunkard in section 4.1-333(A) had
been originally intended to discriminate against homeless alcoholics, 135 the
modern trend of targeted enforcement of section 4.1-333(A) seems difficult to
ignore. Indeed, current doctrine lays out an almost prescriptive means for
avoiding heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis: find an already-

130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
132. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (“But the classification here in
issue is not only ‘imprecise’, it is wholly without any rational basis.”).
133. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Joel has not proven that
Section 43.52 was enacted for the purpose of discriminating against the homeless. Consequently, a
disparate effect on the homeless does not violate equal protection.”).
134. The term habitual drunkard was adopted in February of 1956. Act of Feb. 16, 1956, ch. 53,
1956 Va. Acts 45 (codified as amended at VA. CODE. ANN. § 4.1-333 (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I)). Plaintiffs brought their case in March of 2016.
Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2019).
135. See supra Part II.
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existing law with little legislative history that features a facially neutral term
vague enough to allow for enforcement against the nonsuspect class of choice.
And finding such a law may not be difficult. As Judge Wilkinson observed in
his spirited dissent in Manning, “[m]any civil statutes make use of imprecise
phrases.” 136
One solution that has been proposed in hopes of reducing such incoherent
results is to expand the number of suspect classes, 137 but this proposal does not
address the underlying issue. While providing suspect status for homeless
alcoholics or other classes would help in cases where a law facially classifies on
that basis, facially neutral statutes like section 4.1-333(A) would be a different
matter. As previously discussed, due to a lack of discriminatory intent, the
plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments in Manning would have failed even had
heightened scrutiny been applied. 138 Likewise, unless plaintiffs could point to
legislative intent to discriminate against their class, even their suspect status
would offer little protection. 139 And, much as with section 4.1-333(A), other
facially neutral statutes run into the same potential difficulties if legislative
history is scant.
In light of this, and to resolve the paradox presented by current equal
protection doctrine, I propose that the treatment of disparate impact when a
facially neutral statute is lacking in legislative history be analogous to the
treatment of discriminatory intent. When a court is confronted with a facially
neutral statute and a dearth of legislative history (which has either been lost or
was never originally present), such an absence should not be treated as evidence
of an absence of discriminatory intent. Rather, I propose that a plaintiff’s proof
of disparate impact in such cases be sufficient to trigger something beyond mere
rational basis review. Specifically, like the evidence of discriminatory intent in
136. Manning, 930 F.3d at 303 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
137. Scholars have suggested suspect or quasi-suspect status for a variety of groups, including
homeless people, children, and individuals with disabilities, among others. See Marcia Pearce Burgdorf
& Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a
“Suspect Class” Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 908 (1975) (“It seems
clear, therefore, that under any of the standards for suspectness enunciated by the Supreme Court,
handicapped persons amply qualify.”); Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to Those Most in Need: The
FDA’s Unconstitutional Treatment of Children, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 124 (1997) (“To correct this
shortcoming, Part III argues that the courts should recognize children as a ‘quasi-suspect’ class that can
be denied full protection of the laws only when the government’s justification for differential treatment
can pass heightened judicial scrutiny.”); Vamos, supra note 85, at 745 (“By equal protection standards,
the homeless qualify for suspect classification through historical unequal treatment, relegation to nonentity status in the political process, and possession of immutable characteristics guiding legislative
distinctions.”).
138. See supra Section III.B.
139. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Even where a group is
entitled to more protection and a higher degree of scrutiny is applied, a law neutral on its face, yet
having a disproportionate effect on the group will be deemed to violate the Equal Protection Clause
only if a discriminatory purpose can be proven.”).
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Moreno, proof of disparate impact would remove the presumption that the
justifications proffered are rational, allowing the court to conduct a real rational
basis analysis. Unlike adding to the number of suspect classes, this proposal
would account for statutes like section 4.1-333(A), where its modern
enforcement may have shifted from the original purpose.
Although this proposal may seem counter to current Supreme Court
precedent, 140 it is more accurately characterized as a reframing of precedent for
a small class of cases. My proposal does not suggest that plaintiffs receive
heightened scrutiny in the traditional sense, in terms of either intermediate or
strict scrutiny once disparate impact has been proven. Instead, I suggest that
courts continue to apply rational basis review to cases where disparate impact
alone has been proved, but a rational basis review that bears resemblance to that
applied in Moreno, 141 a form “not equivalent to formal heightened scrutiny.” 142
Known by a variety of names, such as “heightened rational-basis review,”
“rational basis with bite,” “rational basis with teeth,” or “rational basis plus,” 143
it would require a court to actually investigate the justifications put forth by the
government for their actions and determine how well those stated justifications
fit with the ends. 144 The test would remain deferential to the government,
though not to the extent of requiring the plaintiff to “negat[e] every conceivable
basis which might support it.” 145 And, unlike the potential impact of adding new
suspect classifications, 146 the impact of this proposal would be limited: only
statutes with a lack of legislative history and a proven disparate impact would
be affected.
Although such a reframing of precedent by the Supreme Court in the short
term may be unlikely, the Supreme Court has frequently been outpaced by state
and lower courts on constitutional issues. State courts applied intermediate
scrutiny 147 to classifications on sexual orientation more than a decade before the
Supreme Court recognized that discrimination based on such classifications

140. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause was not implicated by disparate impact absent evidence of discriminatory intent).
141. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–38 (1973).
142. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 761 (2011).
143. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1099 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
144. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537 (“Moreover, in practical effect, the challenged classification simply
does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud.”).
145. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
146. See Yoshino, supra note 142, at 762 (“[T]he Court can never give heightened scrutiny to
classifications of, say, twenty groups without diluting the meaning of that scrutiny.”).
147. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (concluding
that sexual orientation “constitute[d] a quasi-suspect classification for purposes of the equal protection
provisions of the state constitution”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]e
hold that legislative classifications based on sexual orientation must be examined under a heightened
level of scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution.”).
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amounted to sex discrimination. 148 Particularly on the issue of heightened
rational basis review, lower and state courts may be amenable to such a change.
As Professor Katie Eyer has pointed out, “rational basis review—as deployed in
the lower and state courts, as well as within the political branches—has often
afforded one of the most plausible openings for . . . constitutional change.” 149
Moreover, even circuit courts have not always been afraid to depart from mere
rational basis review when they find it is warranted. 150 It is difficult to imagine
a case more fitting of departure from traditional standards of proof of
discriminatory intent than a statute so lacking in legislative history as to make
proof of such intent impossible.
This proposal, while not providing an automatic or even certain win for
plaintiffs in cases like Manning, might at least provide a fighting chance. In
Elhady v. Piehota, 151 for example, the Eastern District of Virginia considered an
equal protection challenge brought by twenty-five Muslims, all of whom were
U.S. citizens, to their placement on the government’s terrorist watch list as well
as their subjection to additional screening when flying. 152 Despite concluding
that the plaintiffs had pled some evidence of disparate impact, the court found
insufficient facts to allege “the Watch List was created based on, or operates
through, intentional discrimination” and ultimately concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. 153 Had the pleading required only evidence
of disparate impact to proceed, the plaintiffs equal protection claim would likely
not have been dismissed. More importantly, had the case been allowed to
proceed, the plaintiffs may have been able to gather more information via
discovery about the potential discriminatory intent behind the inner workings
of the watch list. Evidence of discriminatory intent would potentially expose
certain justifications given for the watch list as invalid, even if others survived
rational basis review.

148. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1746–47 (2020) (“[H]omosexuality and
transgender status are distinct concepts from sex. But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on
homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex . . . .”).
149. Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1355
(2018).
150. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that a law
preventing the selling of handmade caskets was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest in consumer protection); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a
prohibition on sale of caskets by anyone not licensed as a funeral director bore “no rational relationship
to any of the articulated purposes of the state”); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991–92 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that the removal of a licensing classification for pest control did not serve a legitimate
government interest); see also Eyer, supra note 149, at 1352 n.152.
151. 303 F. Supp. 3d 453 (E.D. Va. 2017).
152. Id. at 457.
153. Id. at 467. The Plaintiffs’ factual allegation that supported disparate impact was that persons
living in Dearborn, Michigan, a town with a high Arab and Muslim population, were disproportionately
included in the watch list. Id.
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In other cases, “rational basis with bite” for disparate impact might provide
more than just a fighting chance. In United States v. Petersen, 154 the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered an equal protection
challenge to the one-hundred-to-one quantity ratio of powder cocaine to crack
cocaine necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum penalties for drug
trafficking. 155 Under the sentencing guidelines in place at the time, the
defendant’s sentencing range for possessing crack cocaine was from 262 to 327
months, while the range for the same amount of cocaine powder would have
been only 151 to 188 months. 156 The one-hundred-to-one ratio stemmed from
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“the 1986 Act”), 157 which was rushed into
law in response to the perceived dangers of crack cocaine, making legislative
history sparse. 158 What was not sparse, however, was evidence of disparate
impact: a 1995 Sentencing Commission report indicated that Black individuals
made up 27.4% of powder-cocaine offenders but 88.3% of crack-cocaine
offenders, resulting in disproportionately long sentences for Black offenders. 159
Despite the “overwhelming evidence of discriminatory impact,” due to a lack of
discriminatory intent in the initial passage of the 1986 Act, the court found that
any equal protection argument was foreclosed. 160 However, had the court been
allowed to apply “rational basis with bite,” the outcome would have been
different. 161 With disparate impact being clear, the court could have turned its
attention to the government’s justification for the one-hundred-to-one ratio. In
that case, the court’s conclusions that “the assumptions [underlying the ratio]
are no longer supported” and that the ratio “is not rationally justified” may have
been dispositive in favor of the defendant. 162

154. 143 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2001).
155. Id. at 569–70.
156. Id. at 571.
157. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 16,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 31, 42, 47, and 48 U.S.C.).
158. Petersen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 573. Although little legislative history was available, what did
exist showed that Congress believed crack cocaine was more dangerous than cocaine powder and should
be treated differently for sentencing purposes. Id. at 573–74.
159. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY, at xi (1995), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressionaltestimony-and-reports/drug-topics/199502-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/EXECSUM.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X62X-H932]; see also Petersen, 143 F. Supp. at 578. White individuals, likewise, comprised
32.0% of powder-cocaine offenders but only 4.1% of crack-cocaine offenders. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
supra, at xi; see also Petersen, 143 F. Supp. at 578.
160. Petersen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
161. See id. at 586 (“I respectfully think that such a result is not faithful either to reality or to the
equal protection clause.”).
162. Id. The court went on to beseech that “the legal precedents that necessitate such an application
of the clause need to be revisited or amended to afford the protection of the clause to those disparately
affected here—Black defendants convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is intended to protect against “the poor
and the unpopular” from being stripped of their right to “stand on a public
sidewalk . . . at the whim of any police officer.” 163 And while achieving that end
in Manning, the Fourth Circuit’s use of the void-for-vagueness doctrine as a
substitute for equal protection analysis reveals the often counterintuitive results
of requiring evidence of discriminatory intent to mount a challenge against a
facially neutral law, particularly when the legislative history has been lost to
time or never existed in the first place. To avoid these counterintuitive results,
the treatment of disparate impact for statutes lacking in legislative history
should be brought more in line with discriminatory intent, allowing evidence of
disparate impact alone to trigger Moreno analysis—review beyond mere rational
basis scrutiny. In bringing disparate impact in line with discriminatory intent
in these cases, courts will no longer need to fly a flag of convenience by instead
conducting void-for-vagueness analysis as a substitute for equal protection.
Instead, they can let their holding sail under its true colors.
NATHAN PINNELL **

163. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1971) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
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